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Abstract
An informed bidder can voluntarily disclose his private information
on the value of an auctioned asset to rival bidders and the seller. We ex-
amine the informed bidder’s optimal disclosure policy and the resulting
consequences on the seller’s payoff. We show that the informed bid-
der strategically withholds information to create a winner’s curse for
rival bidders, which has a preemptive effect on the rival’s participation.
Taking into account this strategic response, we show that increased
competition among bidders may reduce the seller’s payoff—a surprising
result that is contrary to the common belief that bidder competition
generally increases the seller’s payoff.
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1 Introduction
Bidders in auctions are often asymmetrically informed about the value of the
auctioned asset. Some bidders may gain valuable private information that is
unknown to other bidders or the seller. For example, takeover contests often
involve inside bidders from the management team or existing large sharehold-
ers who obtain private information about the company and contest with other
bidders. Similarly, in the IPO market, institutional buyers are perceived to
know more about the issuing firm (seller)’s value than other investors and even
the firm itself (Rock, 1986). Another example is that in auctions for mining
rights of natural resources, some buyers with expert knowledge are in a bet-
ter position to evaluate and obtain a more accurate estimation regarding the
object’s true value than others.
Prior literature on auctions with asymmetric bidders typically takes the
information asymmetry among bidders as given. In such a framework, the lit-
erature has examined bidders’ bidding strategies for given auction formats, as
well as the optimal auction design that maximizes the seller’s revenues (Maskin
and Riley, 2000; Campbell and Levin, 2000; Povel and Singh, 2004, 2006; Liu,
2016; etc). Little attention is paid to the information disclosure incentive of
the better-informed bidder, which is an important aspect in such auctions.
If the informed bidder can publicly release his information to other bidders
and the seller, what is his optimal disclosure strategy? How does the level of
competition influence the disclosure strategy? Is the seller always better off
when competition is stronger, taking such influences into account?
We address these questions in a simple auction model with one informed
and one uninformed bidder. For ease of exposition, we pose our analysis in
the context of management buyout, which is perhaps the simplest example of
1
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such asymmetric auctions. Management buyout (MBO) is a form of takeover
in which a firm’s management initiates an offer to bring the firm private. The
manager, who seeks to buy the company for the lowest possible price, typically
has access to information on the firm’s future prospects that is not available to
shareholders and outsiders. The management is required to provide incremen-
tal disclosures about the details of the transaction and the fairness of the price,
yet in practice, managers have discretion regarding the amount of information
that they disclose to the market before a buyout announcement.
In our model, a firm’s manager has private information on the firm’s fun-
damental value, and a buyout provides the manager with a private benefit of
control, giving rise to gains to trade. There is an outside bidder who would
also gain a private benefit of control. We assume that the types (benefits of
control) of the manager and outside bidder are common knowledge, and the
former exceeds the latter. The nature of the manager’s information is either
“hard” or “soft,”wherein only hard information can be credibly disclosed. The
timing is as follows. The manager first observes the firm value. When this
information is hard in nature, he decides whether to truthfully disclose it to
shareholders and outside bidders, or to withhold it. After the manager makes
this disclosure decision, he and the outside bidder participate in an ascending
price auction. The auction winner then makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to
shareholders in which the offer must be at least as high as the winning price
from the auction, and shareholders accept an offer if and only if it is at least
as high as the expected firm value given all public information at that time.
The existing literature has focused on settings without the competitive
bidder, and there is a standard unraveling result following Grossman (1980)
and Milgrom (1981). This result reflects the intuition that a manager has an
incentive to reveal bad news to shareholders in order to buy the firm at a
2
low price when the true value is indeed low. However, shareholders are ra-
tional and apply skeptical beliefs upon non-disclosure to require, at the very
least, a break-even price. This breaks down any equilibrium that features non-
disclosure. In our model, two forces prevent such an unraveling.1 The first
force is well-understood: because the manager’s information may be soft in
nature, and hence cannot be credibly disclosed, a manager who receives hard
and favorable information can “pool” through non-disclosure.2
The second force that prevents full unraveling, which is new in our setting,
is the competition from the outside bidder. We show that the competition
introduces an endogenous cost to disclosure. Indeed, even in the limit that the
manager’s information is always hard so that the first force vanishes, the com-
petition effect alone still leads to non-disclosure, breaking down unraveling.
This second force is the key insight of our model, yet incorporating the first
force helps us to derive further comparative static implications with respect
to the nature of information endowment.
Intuitively, the manager’s disclosure influences the outside bidder’s strat-
egy, which affects the manager’s payoff. If the manager discloses his private
information, the bidder faces no uncertainty about the firm value and hence
bids up to his total valuation— the firm value plus the bidder’s type (benefit of
control). This exceeds shareholders’ break-even price, and hence becomes the
final price that the manager pays. If, instead, the manager does not disclose
his private information, the bidder is uncertain about the true firm value. This
1Prior literature has studied the disclosure decision of an informed seller, and finds that
unraveling breaks down for different reasons, such as an explicit disclosure cost (Jovanovic,
1982; Verrecchia, 1983), uncertainty about the seller’s information endowment (Dye, 1985;
Jung and Kwon, 1988), or uncertainty about the receiver’s preference (Bond and Zeng,
2018).
2This is similar to disclosure models with uncertainty about the information endowment
(Dye, 1985), in that a manager who receives information can pool with a manager who
does not.
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uncertainty creates a winner’s curse that preempts the bidder: we show that
the bidder will not bid above the break-even price, and the bidding outcome is
as if the bidder had never participated—an effect similar to Fishman (1988).
As a result, the manager pays the shareholders’ break-even price, which is not
augmented by the bidder’s type. Therefore, the manager’s incentive to disclose
information is reduced when an outside bidder is involved. Furthermore, as
the competition intensifies (the outside bidder’s type increases), the threshold
of disclosure decreases— hence less disclosure.
Because of the preemptive effect of non-disclosure, shareholders benefit
from a bidder’s participation only when the manager possesses and discloses
hard information. Perhaps surprisingly, we find that shareholders may be hurt
by stronger competition. Although more competitive bidders directly increase
payment to shareholders upon disclosure, they also make the manager more
likely to withhold information, which attenuates the benefit shareholders re-
ceive from competition. We show that when the manager’s type is sufficiently
large, the negative effect from increased non-disclosure may dominate. As a
result, more competitive bidders may actually reduce shareholder payoffs, as
the manager reduces disclosure significantly in response to intense competition
from outside bidders.
We then extend our model to consider the possibility that a manager can
be of two types—low or high—whose realization is unknown to the bidder or
shareholders and the bidder’s type is between these two types. This adds a
richer dynamics to the base model: in this scenario the bidder does not nec-
essarily face a winner’s curse because he earns a strictly positive profit if he
wins against a low-type manager. Thus the bidder balances the gains from
winning against a low-type manager versus the losses from winning against a
high-type manager. We show that the bidder’s strategy depends on how his
4
type compares with a critical cutoff value that is some measure of the ex-ante
expected type of the manager. When the bidder’s private value is below the
cutoff value, the winner’s curse effect dominates, and the bidder’s participation
is again preempted given non-disclosure, as with the base model. In this case,
all of our findings vis-a`-vis our base model remain qualitatively unchanged.
When the outside bidder is relatively strong and his private value exceeds the
cutoff, the winner’s curse is of less concern, and the bidder is willing to bid
more aggressively to capitalize on the potential gains from winning the low-
type manager. In this case, the preemptive effect of non-disclosure is reduced,
but importantly, it does not diminish. We show that the manager’s strategic
non-disclosure still has a partial preemptive effect, and the outside bidder’s
role in improving shareholders’ payoff is restrained.
The “preemptive” effect in our model is closely related to the concept of
preemptive bidding in Fishman (1988) that shows how the first mover in a
game can strategically preempt subsequent players. In his private value auc-
tion model, a high-type bidder makes a high (preemptive) initial bid that
discourages a potential rival from learning his own value and participating in
the bidding contest. In our model, by contrast, firm valuation has both a com-
mon component and a bidder-specific component, and information asymmetry
concerns the common component. We show how Fishman’s insights extend to
such a setting. The informed bidder strategically withholds information to
create a winner’s curse that effectively preempts the uninformed bidder from
participating.
Our paper also contributes to the literature on information disclosure in
auction settings. Prior studies have focused on the disclosure problem of the
seller who possesses or controls the access to private signals that affect the
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valuation of the buyers.3 To our best knowledge, our study is the first to
examine the voluntary disclosure decision by an informed bidder in a setting
where other bidders are relatively less informed. Such disclosure enables the
informed bidder to alter the degree of information asymmetry among bidders.
Our findings reveal that in such a setting where the bidder makes the disclosure
decision, withholding of information has a preemptive effect on rival bidders,
and that such preemptive effect is stronger when competition increases so that
greater competition can reduce the seller’s profit in equilibrium.
Our findings provide policy implications for the governance of the buyout
process, highlighting the necessity for the board to account for managers’ dis-
closure incentives when making decisions with regard to intensity with which to
seek outside bidders. A “market check,”which seeks potential competitive bid-
ders to contest with management or puts the firm on auction, is often viewed
as an important safeguard for shareholders receiving fair value.4 We show
that the board must carefully consider the consequences of conducting such a
bidding contest in evaluating its merits for maximizing shareholders’ welfare.
The board should take into account the endogenous response of the manager’s
disclosure policy when seeking outside bidders to contest with the manager. It
is not always in shareholders’ best interest for the board to seek the strongest
bidder in the market, as a strong bidder may discourage a manager from dis-
closing information, which reduces shareholders’ payoffs. Our findings show
3Milgrom and Weber (1982) show that the seller prefers to fully disclose his information
to buyers, which maximizes his expected revenue. Eso and Szentes (2007) also find that
a monopolist seller maximizes the expected value by making available all or part of the
information “new” to the buyers. Li and Shi (2017) show that a seller’s optimal disclosure
is discriminatory, which maximizes the seller’s revenue by releasing different amounts of
additional information to different types of buyers.
4It is common for management buyout transactions to involve competition from outside
bidders. Easterwood, et al. (1994) find that 39 percent of buyout proposals faced explicit
competition and involved multiple bidders, and 16 percent experienced other forms of
competitive takeover activity but did not receive a formal outside offer.
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that the “optimal” level of competition may decrease with the manager’s type.
Our paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the base model and ana-
lyzes the equilibrium. Section 3 extends the analysis to a setting in which the
manager’s type is his private information. Section 4 concludes.
2 Base model
2.1 Model setup
A firm is a potential buyout target with a fundamental value of v, where v is
drawn from a uniform distribution over [0, v¯]. The firm manager (the informed
bidder) observes v perfectly, but outsiders (shareholders and an outside bid-
der) only know its distribution. By acquiring the company via a buyout, the
manager gains a private benefit of control of m > 0; thus the manager values
the firm at v + m. We refer to m as the manager’s type. An outside bidder
would also gain a private benefit of control of t > 0 if he acquires the company.
We refer to t as the bidder’s type. For simplicity, in our base model we assume
both t and m are publicly known and that 0 < t < m.5 We also assume
that m ≤ v¯
2
, which simplifies the analysis and guarantees the uniqueness of
equilibrium. In Section 3 we introduce asymmetric information on types and
show that our basic insights carry through.
While the manager is informed about the value of v, the nature of the man-
ager’s information can be either “soft” or “hard.”“Hard” information refers to
information that can be verified and quantified, for example, a firm’s earnings
or sales. “Soft” information refers to information that cannot be verified, for
example, information about human capital or customer satisfaction, and so
5If, instead, the bidder’s type exceeds the manager’s, the game becomes trivial: that is,
the manager always loses, and hence the disclosure policy is irrelevant.
7
forth.6 With probability γ ∈ (0, 1), the manager’s information is soft. With
probability 1 − γ, the manager’s information is hard. Soft information can-
not be credibly disclosed, nor can the manager credibly convey to the market
that his information is soft. Only when the manager receives hard informa-
tion could he choose to disclose his information. We assume that disclosure
must be truthful. We label the manager’s disclosure choice by ω ∈ {D,ND},
representing disclosure and non-disclosure, respectively. A manager with soft
information can only choose ND, whereas a manager with hard information
can make either choice. The manager’s disclosure choice is publicly observed,
which conveys information about firm value to both shareholders and the out-
side bidder, thereby affecting the buyout outcome.
After the manager makes the disclosure choice, he and the outside bidder
participate in an ascending-price auction in which the price rises continuously
from zero until one bidder (either the manager or the outside bidder) exits.
The winner then makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to shareholders that must be
at least as high as the winning price from the auction. Shareholders are ra-
tional and update their beliefs about the fundamental value v given all public
information available. The public information includes the manager’s disclo-
sure choice ω, the identity of the winner, and the fact that the winner is willing
to pay his final offer. Shareholders accept the offer if they at least break even,
or the buyout fails.
Figure 1 shows the timing of events.
2.2 Equilibrium analysis
In this section we characterize a manager’s disclosure policy and derive equilib-
rium consequences. The presence of the competitive bidder introduces rich dy-
6See for example, Stein, 2002; Bertomeu and Marinovic, 2016.
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Manager
t = 0
The manager
t = 1
The winner
t = 2
Shareholders
t = 3
observes v, and the makes an offer accept the offer
and chooses bidder compete no less than if they break
ω ∈ {D,ND} until one of the winning even; or
if information price.them quits. buyout fails.
is hard.
Figure 1: Timeline.
namic interactions: the manager’s disclosure policy not only influences share-
holder beliefs about the firm value, but more importantly, it affects the bid-
der’s strategy and hence the bidding outcome, which in turn feeds back to
shareholders’ information set in determining the break-even price.
We assume that no weakly dominated strategies are played in equilibrium—
a standard assumption for robustness against trembling hands. As a result,
the bidder will participate in the bidding even though he will not win in equi-
librium given the common knowledge that his type is less than that of the
manager. Our assumption of common knowledge about types is made only for
simplicity, which allows us to convey the key insights in the most transparent
way. In Section 3 we relax this assumption to incorporate asymmetric informa-
tion about the manager’s types, and we show that our insights carry through.7
2.2.1 Equilibrium characterization
Bidding strategies. We first solve the bidding game between the manager
and the bidder, given the manager’s disclosure choice. Our assumption that
no weakly dominated strategies are played in equilibrium pins down the man-
ager’s strategy: because he observes the true firm value v, he has a weakly
7If we instead incorporate private information over t, our main insights also go through.
The analysis is simpler (and not as interesting) in this case.
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dominant strategy of bidding up to βm(v) = v +m.
The bidder’s strategy, on the other hand, depends critically on the man-
ager’s disclosure choice.
Definition 1 The bidder’s strategy, denoted by βωt , is the price at which type-t
bidder exits the ascending price auction given the manager’s disclosure choice
ω.
When the firm value v is disclosed (ω = D), the bidder knows precisely
the value of the firm to him, and hence he has a weakly dominant strategy,
βDt = v + t. Because m > t, the manager wins the auction at β
D
t .
When the manager chooses non-disclosure (ω = ND), the bidder is uncer-
tain about the firm value. This uncertainty creates a winner’s curse for the bid-
der (because winning against the manager implies suffering a loss) that signifi-
cantly affects the bidder’s strategy as we will show. Technically, complications
arise because a weakly dominant strategy does not exist and multiple equi-
libria may arise;8 nonetheless, we show that βNDt , the bidder’s strategy given
non-disclosure, is bounded. The following summarizes the bidder’s strategies.
Lemma 1 When the manager discloses firm value, the bidder’s strategy is
βDt = v+ t. When the manager does not disclose, the bidder’s strategy β
ND
t is
bounded, t ≤ βNDt ≤ min {m, v¯ + t} ≤ m.
The result t ≤ βNDt reflects that the firm’s fundamental value v is at
least zero, and hence the bidder values the firm at least t. The other result,
βNDt ≤ min {m, v¯ + t} , is a key component of our analysis. To understand
8Multiple equilibria arise due to freedom in specifying out-of-equilibrium beliefs about
the expected firm value if the manager exits prior to his equilibrium strategy.
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it, first note that βNDt ≤ v¯ + t because v ≤ v¯. Next, suppose the bidder wins
at some price pe ∈ (m, v¯ + t]. It then must be the case that v = pe −m such
that the manager drops out at pe,
9 implying that the bidder would suffer an
immediate loss of m− t upon winning. This is the source of the winner’s curse
that we previously mentioned. As a result, the bidder would never bid past m.
The buyout offer. Recall that the manager’s buyout offer after winning the
auction must be at least as high as the winning price from the auction. Thus
pω ≥ βωt for ω ∈ {D,ND}, (1)
where pω denotes the manager’s buyout offer.
Shareholders are rational and set their break-even price as the expected
firm value conditional on all public information available. We denote by vωBE
this break-even price for a given disclosure strategy ω. When the manager
discloses v, we simply have
vDBE = v. (2)
Because under disclosure the outside bidder bids up to v + t, which exceeds
vDBE, the manager’s buyout offer is
pD = βDt = v + t. (3)
When the manager does not disclose, shareholders update their beliefs about
firm value accordingly, given their belief about types of managers who do not
disclose and taking into account that the manager’s offer pND is profitable to
the manager—namely, v +m ≥ pND. Thus
vNDBE = E[v|ND, v ≥ pND −m], (4)
9This occurs in equilibrium with a positive probability: if v = pe −m, and the manager
has soft information and hence cannot disclose v, he exits at pe.
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and shareholders accept the offer if and only if
pND ≥ vNDBE . (5)
Because the manager makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer, the offer is the lowest
price that satisfies (5) and (1). Otherwise, the manager could lower the offer
and still have it accepted. Thus, in equilibrium, we have
pND = max{βNDt , vNDBE }. (6)
Given βNDt and shareholders’ belief about the manager’s disclosure strat-
egy, Eq. (6)—where pND is the unknown—has at least one solution over
pND ∈ [0, v¯]. This follows from the intermediate value theorem and Lemma
1.10 If multiple solutions exist to (6), pND is the smallest of them.
By Lemma 1, the right-hand side of (6) is no less than t , thus
pND ≥ t. (7)
Manager’s disclosure strategy. When the manager has hard information,
he makes the disclosure choice based on the respective payoffs, disclosing if
and only if the buyout payment upon disclosure is less than that upon non-
disclosure; i.e., pD < pND. Thus, substituting (3) for pD, we obtain the man-
ager’s disclosure strategy as follows.
Lemma 2 A manager with hard information discloses if and only if v < µ,
where
µ = pND − t. (8)
10The right-hand side of (6) is no less than t and no greater than v¯ for all values of
pND ∈ [0, v¯]; when pND = 0, the left-hand side of (6) is less than the right-hand side,
whereas when pND = v¯, the left-hand side of (6) is no less than the right-hand side.
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Lemma 2 shows that the manager’s disclosure strategy is characterized by
a threshold µ, which is the value of v when the manager is indifferent between
disclosing and non-disclosing. By (7), µ ≥ 0. Furthermore, the lemma implies
that a manager who receives hard information and chooses not to disclose is
always willing to make an offer at pND, because his expected payoff from the
buyout is positive, v+m−pND > 0 (by v ≥ µ and m > t). However, a manager
who receives soft information and cannot credibly disclose it may not always
find it profitable to make an offer that is acceptable to shareholders. Specifi-
cally, when the firm value is so low that the expected payoff for the manager
becomes negative (i.e., when v+m < pND), the manager chooses not to make
an offer, foregoing the buyout opportunity even though it is socially optimal.
These implications facilitate the computation of shareholders’ break-even
price given non-disclosure, vNDBE , in (4). Concretely, shareholders’ updating of
beliefs about the firm value is based on the probabilities of two events: (1) a
manager with hard information chooses to withhold the information, implying
v ≥ µ; and (2) a manager with soft information cannot disclose, but chooses
to make a buyout offer at pND, implying v ≥ max{pND −m, 0}. We denote
the probabilities of these events by τ1 and τ2, respectively, where
τ1 = (1− γ) v¯ − µ
v¯
,
τ2 = γ
v¯ −max{pND −m, 0}
v¯
.
Substituting the event probabilities τ1 and τ2 into the conditional expectation
in (4), yields
vNDBE =
τ1
τ1 + τ2
E[v|v ≥ µ] + τ2
τ1 + τ2
E[v|v ≥ max{pND −m, 0}]
=
1
τ1 + τ2
(τ1
v¯ + µ
2
+ τ2
v¯ + max{pND −m, 0}
2
). (9)
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Lemma 3 Under non-disclosure, the bidder’s exit price is below shareholders’
break-even price: βNDt ≤ vNDBE .
To understand the lemma, observe that (9) yields vNDBE ≥ v¯2 . Intuitively,
this reflects that the manager’s non-disclosure and willingness to make an
offer both convey positive news about firm value. The reason is that the non-
disclosure either implies v ≥ µ if the manager has hard information or conveys
no information about firm value if the manager has soft information, and that
the willingness to make an offer pND implies v ≥ pND−m. Hence shareholders’
updated belief about firm value is no less than the prior. By Lemma 1 and
m ≤ v¯
2
, Lemma 3 follows.
Lemma 3 has the critical implication that when the manager withholds
information, the bidder’s exit price is even below the break-even price of share-
holders, although the bidder values the firm more than the shareholders. This
is in sharp contrast to what happens when the manager discloses firm value, in
which case, as (3) shows, the bidder will bid beyond shareholders’ break-even
price, rendering shareholders with a profit of t. Such a contrast reflects our
insight that non-disclosure creates a winner’s curse for the bidder that deters
the bidder from competition. Lemma 3 shows that this deterrence is so strong
that it fully preempts the bidder. The bidding outcome is as if the bidder had
never participated: shareholders do not receive any benefit from the bidder’s
participation, which in turn benefits the manager. This effect, as we will show,
creates incentives for the manager to withhold information in equilibrium.11
11If we relax our assumption m ≤ v¯2 to allow for m > v¯2 , in some of the (multiple)
equilibria, it is then possible that βNDt > v
ND
BE such that shareholders do receive some
benefit from the bidder’s participation. Nonetheless, our basic insights remain in that upon
non-disclosure, shareholders do not receive the full benefit of the bidder’s participation,
and this creates incentives for the manager to withhold information. Concretely, Lemma 1
implies βNDt ≤ v¯ + t; as long as the strict inequality holds (which would be the case in all
equilibria if m < v¯ + t), when firm value is sufficiently high, the manager makes a strictly
higher profit if he withholds than if he discloses information.
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By Lemma 3, (6) simplifies to
pND = vNDBE . (10)
Because vNDBE ≥ v¯2 > m, by (10), max
{
pND −m, 0} = pND − m. Thus (9)
simplifies to
vNDBE =
1
τ1 + τ2
(τ1
v¯ + µ
2
+ τ2
v¯ + pND −m
2
). (11)
Combining the indifference condition in (8), the buyout offer in (10), and
the break-even price in (11), we obtain a unique solution over µ ∈ [0, v¯]:
µ = v¯ − t−
√
γm2 + (1− γ) t2. (12)
Plugging (12) into (8) yields
pND = v¯ −
√
γm2 + (1− γ) t2. (13)
Proposition 1 In equilibrium, the non-disclosure threshold µ for a manager
with hard information is given by (12). Upon non-disclosure, the bidder exits
before the shareholders’ break-even price, and the manager buys out the firm
at a price given by (13).
2.2.2 Equilibrium implications
To understand the implications of the equilibrium in Proposition 1, we first
compare with a benchmark case in which the competitive bidder is not present.
Observe that (10) and (11) hold in this case, and that (8) holds with zero re-
placing t. Hence, the disclosure strategy and the winning price are the same
as in Proposition 1 upon setting t = 0. Thus we have the following corollary.
Corollary 1 Without the competitive bidder, the non-disclosure threshold for
a manager with hard information and the shareholders’ break-even price are:
15
µ0 = p
ND
0 = v¯ − m
√
γ. when the manager’s information is always hard
(γ → 0), information fully unravels (µ0 → v¯).
The result that µ0 < v¯ in Corollary 1 reflects the incentive to withhold
information in the presence of soft information. The intuition has been ex-
plained in the existing literature on voluntary disclosure (typically by the
seller) with uncertainty about the information endowment in the absence of
competition (Dye, 1985; Jung and Kwon, 1988): An informed seller benefits
from withholding unfavorable information and pooling with a seller who does
not receive information, which increases the price he can sell. In our setting,
the informed buyer (the manager) who receives hard information about firm
value above a certain threshold optimally withholds information, this allows
him to pool with those managers with soft information that cannot be credibly
disclosed, thereby lowering the payment he has to make.
However, this effect weakens when the ex-ante probability that the man-
ager’s information is hard increases (γ ↓); that is, when the market expects the
manager is likely to have hard information, the disclosure threshold rises—the
manager discloses more. In the limit that the manager’s information is always
hard, the manager always discloses. This is the standard unraveling result in
Grossman (1981) and Milgrom (1981). If shareholders are certain that the
manager’s information is hard, they apply the skeptical belief: when the man-
ager withholds information, shareholders infer that the manager is concealing
favorable information which, if disclosed, would increase his payment. In re-
sponse to this, the manager always discloses his information in equilibrium.
When a competitive bidder is present, the manager’s incentives to disclose
information change. Intuitively, in the benchmark case without the bidder, the
manager makes a profit of m when he discloses firm value. With the bidder,
16
when firm value is disclosed, the manager’s payment for the buyout is v + t,
which is the exit price of the bidder in the bidding contest, and the manager’s
profit is only m − t. By contrast, if the manager withholds information, he
is able to effectively preempt the bidder from participating, thus still making
an expected profit of m. Thus, the manager’s incentives to withhold informa-
tion are stronger when an outside bidder is present due to the wedge between
the manager’s payoffs (m versus m − t). This breaks down the unraveling
result without competition when γ approaches zero, and lowers the disclosure
threshold at all γ.
Proposition 2 For all γ > 0, the non-disclosure threshold is lower with the
outside bidder than without, µ0 > µ. In particular, when γ approaches zero,
non-disclosure persists (µ|γ=0 = v¯ − 2t < v¯) with the bidder.
2.3 Comparative statics
We now examine the comparative statics of the disclosure threshold µ and
shareholders’ payoffs with respect to the following: (1) the manager’s infor-
mation nature as measured by γ, (2) the competitiveness of the bidder as mea-
sured by t, and (3) the manager’s benefit of control as measured by his type m.
2.3.1 Disclosure thresholds
The manager’s information nature affects the equilibrium disclosure thresh-
old through its impact on shareholders’ belief given non-disclosure. When the
manager’s information is more likely to be soft (γ increases), shareholders be-
lieve that any non-disclosure is more likely due to the manager’s inability to
credibly communicate information even though he may have observed a low
value. Hence, the expected firm value conditional on non-disclosure is lower.
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As a result, a manager who receives hard information can benefit by with-
holding information and paying a lower break-even price, which leads to less
disclosure.
Corollary 2 For any t, the equilibrium non-disclosure threshold µ decreases
with γ.
We now analyze the impact of the intensity of competition (as captured
by t) on the manager’s disclosure policy. We show this impact is strong be-
cause competition induces two compounding effects that mutually reinforce
and feedback. First, recall that the manager’s profit is m − t when he dis-
closes the true value to the bidder. The stronger the competition (larger t),
the lower the manager’s profit given disclosure. Therefore, the manager’s in-
centive to create the winner’s curse through non-disclosure is stronger when
competition increases, taking shareholders’ break-even price as given. Second,
the increased incentives to withhold information—which leads to lower µ—
decrease shareholders’ expectation of the firm value upon non-disclosure and
further increases the incentives to withhold information.12
Corollary 3 Stronger competition leads to less disclosure: for any γ, the equi-
librium non-disclosure threshold µ decreases with the bidder’s type t.
Finally, we examine the effects of the manager’s own type m.
Corollary 4 A stronger manager discloses less: for any γ, the equilibrium
non-disclosure threshold µ decreases with the manager’s type m.
12Intuitively, (11) shows how vNDBE decreases as µ decreases; more precisely, (13) shows
how pND decreases as t increases.
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Corollary 4 shows that the manager’s benefit of control m has a similar ef-
fect on the disclosure threshold as the bidder’s type t. However, the intuition
is different. When m increases, a manager with soft information (who is un-
able to disclose firm value) can afford the shareholders’ break-even price even
if the actual firm value is low. Therefore, given non-disclosure, shareholders’
expected firm value is lower. This in turn incentivizes a manager with hard in-
formation to withhold his information (in which case he pays the shareholders
a lower break-even price, thus driving down the disclosure threshold.
2.3.2 Shareholders’ expected profit
In this section we examine shareholders’ expected profit in equilibrium. Upon
non-disclosure, shareholders receive zero expected profit because the manager
pays the break-even price; upon disclosure, shareholders receive a premium of t
above the firm value because the bidder bids up to v+t. Therefore, the overall
expected profit takes a simple form, which is the probability that the manager
discloses, multiplied by t. As the manager discloses only when he has hard
information (with probability 1− γ) and v < µ (with probability µ
v¯
), we have:
Corollary 5 In equilibrium, shareholders’ expected profit is
Πs =
(1− γ)µ
v¯
t. (14)
By (12), µ is a function of the manager’s information nature γ, the man-
ager’s type m, and the bidder’s type t, and thus (14) expresses shareholders’
expected profit Πs as a function of γ, m, and t (either explicitly or implicitly).
We now use (14) to analyze how Πs varies with γ, m, and t.
Corollary 6 Shareholders’ expected profit in equilibrium decreases with both
γ and m.
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Intuitively, when γ increases, the manager’s information is more likely to
be soft, which directly reduces the likelihood of disclosure. Furthermore, in the
event that the manager has hard information, the equilibrium non-disclosure
threshold µ decreases with γ as (12) shows, which further (indirectly) reduces
the likelihood of disclosure. Taken together, increasing γ leads to an overall
reduction in disclosure, lowering shareholders’ expected profit from buyout.
Similarly, by (12), an increase in the manager’s type m leads to a reduction in
µ, which reduces the likelihood of disclosure and hence lowering shareholders’
expected profit.
By contrast, the impact of t (intensity of competition) on shareholders’
payoff is not as straightforward because two opposing forces exist. On one
hand, increased competition directly raises the winning price from bidding
upon disclosure, hence benefiting shareholders. On the other hand, the disclo-
sure threshold µ decreases in t as (12) shows. This reflects that the manager
is more likely to withhold information in response to stronger competition,
which reduces shareholders’ expected profit. Taking the derivative of (14)
with respect to t illustrates this tradeoff:
dΠs
dt
=
∂Πs
∂t
+
∂Πs
∂µ
∂µ
∂t
=
1− γ
v¯
µ︸ ︷︷ ︸
Direct effect
+
1− γ
v¯
t
∂µ
∂t︸ ︷︷ ︸
Indirect effect
=
1− γ
v¯
(
µ− t
(
1 +
(1− γ) t√
γm2 + (1− γ) t2
))
, (15)
where the direct effect is positive, ∂Πs
∂t
> 0, and the indirect effect is negative,
∂Πs
∂µ
∂µ
∂t
< 0.
To determine the net effect, we first establish a desirable property of Πs
that simplifies the analysis.
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Lemma 4 Shareholders’ expected profit Πs is concave in t:
d2Πs
dt2
< 0 at all
t ∈ [0,m).
Because dΠs
dt
|t=0 > 0 by (15) and (12), Lemma 4 implies that Πs can only
take one of two forms over t ∈ [0,m): strictly increasing or single-peaked. The
following proposition identifies the conditions for these two cases.
Proposition 3 (i) When m < v¯
4−γ , shareholders’ expected profit, Πs, strictly
increases over t ∈ [0,m); (ii) when m > v¯
4−γ , Πs is maximized at t = ts, where
ts < m is the unique solution to the first-order condition µ + t
∂µ
∂t
= 0, where
µ is a function of t given by (12).
To understand Proposition 3, observe that in light of Lemma 4, whether
Πs is strictly increasing or single-peaked over t ∈ [0,m) depends only on the
sign of dΠs
dt
as t approaches m from below. By (12) and (15) we have
dΠs
dt
|t→m = 1− γ
v¯
(v¯ − (4− γ)m) . (16)
It follows that dΠs
dt
|t→m < 0 if m < v¯4−γ and dΠsdt |t→m > 0 if m > v¯4−γ , thus
establishing the proposition.
The results in Proposition 3 are somewhat surprising. Observe that casual
intuition might suggest that (1) a stronger bidder would always benefit share-
holders, and (2) when the firm has a strong manager, intensified competition
would be particularly helpful for shareholders to extract surplus from the man-
ager. However, Proposition 3 shows that such intuition is incomplete on both
accounts: shareholders’ payoffs may decrease when a bidder is more compet-
itive and this non-monotonicity occurs precisely when the manager is strong.
Proposition 3 highlights the insight that a stronger competitor creates more
incentives for the manager to preempt the bidder by withholding information,
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which deprives shareholders from the benefit of the bidder’s participation. The
negative impact on the shareholders’ profit is particularly high for a stronger
manager who benefits more from preempting the bidder. Concretely, recall
that a manager with hard information makes a profit of m − t when he dis-
closes, whereas his expected profit is m upon non-disclosure. The wedge be-
tween m and m−t creates incentives for the manager to withhold information.
For given m, when t is close to m, the wedge is widest—hence the incentive to
withhold information is the strongest as the manager’s profit approaches zero
when he discloses. When m increases, this (maximum) wedge widens, which
increases the manager’s incentive to withhold information, thereby increasing
the negative (indirect) effect of competition on shareholders’ profit, causing
the latter to be non-monotonic in t.
Figure 2 illustrates the monotonicity of shareholders’ profit over the level
of competition when m is small, and the non-monotonicity of the relationship
when m is large. We set v¯ = 2, γ = 0.5. We choose m = 0.2 in the left panel
and m = 0.9 in the right panel, and let the level of competition t vary over
(0,m). The left graph shows how shareholders’ profit strictly increases over
t. By contrast, shareholders’ profit in the right graph is non-monotone in t:
shareholders’ profit first increases until some maximum point, after which it
starts to decrease with t.
Further underscoring the intuition for Proposition 3, the following corollary
shows the optimal degree of competition decreases with manager type.
Corollary 7 When m > v¯
4−γ , the maximum point ts decreases with m.
To see this, we write down ∂
∂m
(∂Πs
∂t
), the marginal effect of increasing m on
the first-order derivative of Πs with respect to t as in (15):
22
Figure 2: Base Model: the effect of t.
∂
∂m
(
∂Πs
∂t
) =
1− γ
v¯
 ∂µ∂m︸︷︷︸
Direct effect
+ t
∂
∂m
(
∂µ
∂t
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Indirect effect
 (17)
A stronger manager (m ↑) has two consequences: (1) from Corollary 4,
∂µ
∂m
< 0, the non-disclosure threshold is lower, which reduces the positive
(direct) effect of increased competition (on the disclosure threshold); (2) the
cross-partial derivative is positive, ∂
∂m
(
∂µ
∂t
)
> 0, which reduces the negative
(indirect) effect of increased competition (on the disclosure threshold). We
show (in the Appendix) that the direct effect in (1) exceeds the indirect effect
in (2), hence ∂
∂m
(∂Πs
∂t
) < 0, establishing the corollary. Therefore, the level of
competition that maximizes shareholders payoffs decreases with m.
3 Disclosure policy when the manager’s type
is private information
In the base model, the manager’s type m is publicly known and larger than
the outside bidder’s; hence, the manager always wins the bidding contest. In
this section we extend the model to a setting in which the manager’s type
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is his private information, and we incorporate a positive probability that the
manager’s type is less than that of the bidder so that the bidder has a chance
to win in equilibrium. Specifically, we assume the bidder’s type t is still pub-
licly known, but the manager can be of either low-type ml or high-type mh,
with ml < t < mh ≤ v¯2 . The probability that the manager is of low-type is
q ∈ (0, 1) , which is common knowledge, but the realization of the manager’s
type is the manager’s private information.
As with the base model, the manager observes the firm’s fundamental value
v. A manager with hard information chooses his disclosure policy based on
v and his type. In the current setting, however, we may not have a unique
equilibrium as in the base model, because some low-type managers may be
indifferent between disclosure and non-disclosure. To see this, suppose a low-
type manager with hard information discloses v. The bidder will then outbid
the manager because t > ml, leaving the manager with zero profit. Thus the
low-type manager always weakly prefers withholding information. However,
on the other hand, if a low-type manager withholds information when v is
low, shareholders’ break-even price may exceed the manager’s value for the
firm (which is v+ml), rendering the manager with zero profit. Consequently,
a low-type manager with hard information will be indifferent between disclos-
ing and withholding information when v is low, which leads to multiplicity of
equilibria that is not present in the base model.13 In this section, we focus on
equilibria in which the manager chooses to withhold information whenever he
is indifferent between disclosing and withholding—hence the low-type manager
always withholds information. This restores the uniqueness of the equilibrium
as we will show and eases the analysis.14
13In the base model, by contrast, the manager is indifferent between disclosing and
non-disclosing only at single point v = µ.
14The qualitative results are unchanged in other types of equilibria when we do not
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3.1 The bidding strategies and the buyout offer
Before we solve the equilibrium, we first characterize the manager and bidder’s
strategies in the bidding contest.
The bidding strategies. The manager’s strategy is straightforward,
which is to bid up to βmj = v +mj, where j ∈ {h, l} is his type. For the bid-
der’s strategy, we again denote it by βωt , where ω ∈ {D,ND} is the manager’s
disclosure choice. The bidder’s strategy given disclosure is still βDt = v + t, as
in the base model. We now examine the bidder’s strategy upon non-disclosure,
βNDt , which will differ from the base model because the bidder now faces asym-
metric information concerning not only firm value v, but also the manager’s
type. We first establish some useful bounds on βNDt .
(1). βNDt ≥ mh: First, because v ≥ 0, the bidder will at least bid up to t;
i.e., βNDt ≥ t. Second, it is not optimal to exit at any point p ∈ [t,mh),
because if the bidder wins at such a price, it must be the case that the
manager is of low-type ml and the firm value v = p − ml (so that the
manager exits at p). In such a case, the bidder would make a positive
profit of v + t− p = t−ml.
(2). βNDt ≤ v¯+ml: If the manager stays past v¯+ml, he must be of high-type
mh, thus the bidder will withdraw from the competition for fear of the
winner’s curse.
Summarizing these two cases, we have
βNDt ∈ [mh, v¯ +ml]. (18)
restrict the manager’s disclosure decision when he is indifferent. The corresponding analysis
is omitted in the paper.
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We next show that in equilibrium, βNDt will be either at the upper or lower
bound of (18), depending on whether t is large or small.
Lemma 5 The bidder’s bidding strategy upon non-disclosure is uniquely given
by
βNDt =
{
v¯ +ml if t > t (i)
mh if t < t (ii)
,
where
t ≡ qml + (1− q)γmh
q + (1− q)γ .
To understand the lemma, suppose the manager does not disclose firm
value, the bidder stays in the auctions and wins at a price between [p, p+ dp],
where p ∈ (mh, v¯ +ml) is the running price and dp is infinitesimally small.
Because the low-type manager never discloses in equilibrium, the probability
that the manager is of low-type, chooses non-disclosure, and exits between
[p, p+ dp] is q dp
v¯
. On the other hand, the probability that the manager is
of high-type, chooses non-disclosure, and exits between [p, p+ dp] is at least
(1− q) γ dp
v¯
, where γ is the probability that the manager has soft information—
hence, he does not disclose—and the inequality reflects that the manager may
possibly withhold information even when he has hard information. Thus by
Bayes’ rule, conditional on the manager withholding information and exiting
between [p, p+ dp], the probability that the manager is of high-type is at least
(1−q)γ
(1−q)γ+q . The bidder’s winning payoff is t−mh and t−ml, respectively, when
he wins against a high-type and low-type manager. Thus the bidder’s overall
expected payoff, κ, satisfies
κ ≤
(
q
(1− q) γ + q
)
(t−ml) + (1− q) γ
(1− q) γ + q (t−mh) (19)
= t− t. (20)
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By (20), when t < t, the bidder’s expected profit will be negative if he
wins at a price above mh. This establishes part (ii) of Lemma 5 by (18). In
the proof of the lemma we show that when t > t, (19) holds as an equality,
establishing part (i) of the lemma.
Lemma 5 shows that the bidder’s strategy depends critically on how his
type t compares with t, which is some measure of the ex-ante expected type of
the manager (it is not the simple ex-ante expected value). If t < t, the bidder
expects to earn negative profit if he wins against the manager at a price above
mh, thus the bidder bids up only to mh, the lower bound of (18). Conversely,
when t > t, the bidder expects to earn positive profit by bidding past mh. As
a result, he optimally bids up to the upper- bound v¯ +ml.
15
The buyout offer. The winner from the first-stage bidding contest makes
a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the shareholders. Similar to the base model, the
winner’s buyout offer needs to be at least as high as both the winning price
and the shareholders’ break-even price conditional on all public information.
The winner’s offer is the minimum price that satisfies both conditions. Dif-
ferent from the base model, however, because now the bidder has a positive
probability of winning, both the winning price and the winner’s identity are
taken into account when shareholders determine the break-even price.
When the high-type manager with hard information chooses to disclose v—
i.e., when ω = D— the shareholders’ break-even price is simply vD = v. The
bidding outcome is the same as in the base model for the high-type manager:
He wins at the bidder’s exit price βDt , which is greater than the break-even
price. Therefore, the buyout offer made by the high-type manager given dis-
15If t = t, the bidder is indifferent between winning and losing at p ∈ (mh, v¯ +ml). This
leads to multiple equilibria, which is an uninteresting case that we do not examine.
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closure is simply the winning price,
pD = βDt . (21)
When the firm value is not disclosed— i.e., when ω = ND— the share-
holders’ break-even price depends on who wins the bidding contest and the
corresponding winning price. Specifically, if the bidder wins, then the winning
price must be the low-type manager’s exit price βml = v+ml, which is always
above the firm’s true value. The buyout offer made by the bidder is then
simply the winning price, βml .
If, instead, the manager wins the bidding contest, shareholders set the
break-even price based on the fact that the manager chooses non-disclosure,
and the offer p is profitable to the manager. Denoting by vNDBE (same as in
the base model) this break-even price given non-disclosure and the manager’s
winning the auction, we have
vNDBE = E[v|ND, v +mj ≥ pND]. (22)
Then the manager’s buyout offer given non-disclosure and winning the
auction is
pND = max{βNDt , vNDBE }. (23)
To determine pND, we first compare βNDt in Lemma 5 and the shareholders’
break-even price in (22).
Lemma 6 Given non-disclosure, the following result holds,{
βNDt < v
ND
BE if t < t,
βNDt > v
ND
BE if t > t.
Intuitively, by Lemma 5, when the bidder is relatively weak such that t < t,
the bidder’s strategy is to bid up to βNDt = mh. By a similar argument as
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in the base model, vNDBE ≥ v¯2 > mh, shareholders’ break-even price is always
higher than the bidder’s exit price. Thus, when the bidder is weak, non-
disclosure preempts the bidder, as in the base model, because the bidder is
concerned about the winner’s curse that non-disclosure creates and hence bids
conservatively. On the other hand, when the bidder is strong, t > t, he bids
up to βNDt = v¯ + ml, which exceeds shareholders’ break-even price because
βNDt > v¯ > v
ND
BE . Intuitively, when the bidder is highly competitive, he is less
concerned about the winner’s curse and bids more aggressively.
By Lemma 6, the manager’s take-it-or-leave-it offer upon non-disclosure in
(23) becomes
pND =
{
vNDBE if t < t,
βNDt if t > t.
(24)
3.2 Equilibrium
Given the bidder’s strategies and the buyout offer as previously determined,
we solve the disclosure policy of the high-type manager with hard information.
The manager decides whether to disclose by comparing the respective prices
that he has to pay upon disclosing and non-disclosing. If he discloses, the
buyout payment is pD = v+ t by (21). If he does not disclose, he pays pND in
(24). Therefore, the high-type manager discloses if and only if v ≤ µh, where
µh is the critical value that the manager is indifferent between disclosing and
non-disclosing:
µh + t = p
ND. (25)
We now solve the disclosure threshold µh for the two cases in (24).
Case 1 (t < t): In this case, the buyout offer is shareholders’ break-even
price,
pND = vNDBE . (26)
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Now we solve for the shareholders’ break-even price in (22). Given non-
disclosure and that the manager’s winning price does not exceed vNDBE (Lemma
6), shareholders infer that the manager is of the following three scenarios: (1)
a high-type with hard information but chooses ND (following the previous
logic, such a manager is always willing to make an offer vNDBE ); (2) a high-type
with soft information and v ≥ pND−mh; or (3) a low-type with v ≥ pND−ml.
Denote the probability of each scenario by δ1, δ2, and δ3, respectively, we have:
δ1 = (1− q) (1− γ) v¯ − µh
v¯
,
δ2 = (1− q) γ v¯ − p
ND +mh
v¯
,
δ3 = q
v¯ − pND +ml
v¯
.
Given these probabilities, by Bayes’ law, shareholders’ conditional expec-
tation of the firm value in (22) becomes
vND =
1
δ1 + δ2 + δ3
[δ1
v¯ + µh
2
+ δ2
v¯ + pND −mh
2
+ δ3
v¯ + pND −ml
2
]. (27)
Combining (25), (26) and (27), we have a unique solution over µh ∈ [0, v¯].
Using an underscore to denote the corresponding quantities for Case 1, we
have16
µ
h
≡ v¯ − t−
√
t2 + q (m2l − t2) + (1− q) γ (m2h − t2). (28)
pND ≡ v¯ −
√
t2 + q (m2l − t2) + (1− q) γ (m2h − t2).
Proposition 3a When t < t, in equilibrium the high-type manager discloses
if and only if v ≤ µ
h
, where µ
h
is given by (28).
16The base model solution corresponds to the special case of the current one in which q
approaches 0.
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Case 2 (t > t): In this case, the manager’s buyout offer is the bidder’s
exit strategy,
pND = βNDt (29)
The critical value of the indifference point for the manager then becomes:
µ¯h = β
ND
t − t. (30)
Substituting the bidder’s strategy from Lemma 5 when t > t— i.e., βNDt =
v¯ +ml— we get
µ¯h ≡ v¯ +ml − t. (31)
Proposition 3b When t > t, in equilibrium the high-type manager with hard
information discloses if and only if v ≤ µ¯h ≡ v¯ +ml − t.
In both Cases 1 and 2, the strategy of the high-type manager is to withhold
good news, disclosing only if the firm value is below a certain threshold. The
threshold in Case 1 is lower than that in Case 2; i.e., µ
h
< µ¯h. Intuitively, if
the bidder expects to be stronger than the manager, his fear of winner’s curse
is less, and hence non-disclosure is less useful as a means of preemption.
The comparative statistics results in the base model all go through in Case
1: (1) for any given t, the equilibrium disclosure threshold decreases with γ;
(2) for any given γ, the equilibrium disclosure threshold decreases with t; and
(3) for any given t and γ, the equilibrium disclosure threshold decreases with
mh and ml. In Case 2, the equilibrium disclosure threshold decreases with t,
but is independent of information softness γ.
Non-disclosure and the preemptive effect: The preemptive effects of
non-disclosure, as identified in Section 2, extend to the current setting. In Case
1, the preemptive effect is essentially identical to that in the base model: share-
holders do not receive more than the expected firm value when the manager
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withholds information, and non-disclosure preempts the bidder’s participation.
In fact, the implication of this preemption is more dramatic than in the base
model: even when the manager is of low-type, who would have no chance of
winning if he disclosed firm value, now, when firm value is high (v > pND−ml),
he will win and receive a positive profit when he withholds information.
Even in Case 2 in which the bidder’s type is strong and hence he is less
concerned about the winner’s curse, partial preemptive effect still exists when
the manager withholds information. Consider the high-type manager with
hard information who chooses not to disclose—and hence v > v¯ + ml − t—
the buyout price is the bidder’s exit price v¯+ml when the manager withholds
information, whereas it would be v + t > v¯ + ml if the manager disclosed his
information. Thus, shareholders do not receive the full benefit of the bidder’s
participation upon non-disclosure.
4 Conclusion
This paper examines the disclosure strategy of an informed bidder and the
resulting consequences on seller’s payoff in a setting in which the informed
bidder can voluntarily disclose his private information about the value of the
auctioned asset. The informed bidder has a publicly known benefit of control
so that there are gains to trade. He competes with an outside bidder who also
has a publicly-known benefit of control, and the winner’s offer needs to leave
the seller with a non-negative expected profit.
We show that the presence of the outside bidder creates incentives for
the informed bidder to withhold information. Our insight is that the non-
disclosure creates a winner’s curse for the outside bidder, which has a preemp-
tive effect such that the outside bidder will exit at a low price. Taking into
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account this endogenous response by the informed bidder, we obtain a counter-
intuitive result that increased competition may reduce the seller’s payoff. A
stronger outside bidder makes the informed bidder more likely to withhold
information, the cost of which (to the seller) can outweigh the benefit.
We extend our model to a setting in which the informed bidder’s type (ben-
efit of control) is his private information. Thus the informed bidder is privately
informed about both the asset value and his own type. We show that as long
as there is a positive probability that the informed bidder is of a higher type
than the outside bidder, non-disclosure and preemption will still occur in equi-
librium such that the seller does not receive the full benefit of competition. In
this regard, our findings regarding non-disclosure and the unexpected effects
of competition on the seller’s payoff are general.
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Proofs
Proof. Proposition 1
Substituting τ1 = (1− γ) v¯−µv¯ and τ2 = γ v¯−(p
ND−m)
v¯
into the right hand-side
of (11) and combining with (8) and (10), we obtain that
pND =
pND2 − 2pNDt+ t2 − v¯2 + (m− t)(m− 2pND + t)γ
2(pND − t− v¯ −mγ + tγ) . (32)
We then solve the above equation for pND. We obtain two solutions of pND:
pND = v¯ ±√γm2 + (1− γ) t2. Recalling that pND < v¯, we can conclude that
pND = v¯ −
√
γm2 + (1− γ) t2. (33)
Combining the above equation with the indifference condition in (8), we can
solve for µ as
µ = v¯ − t−
√
γm2 + (1− γ) t2. (34)
Proof. Proof of Proposition 2
As derived in Corollary 1 and Proposition 1, µ0 = v¯ − m√γ and µ =
v¯ − t−√γm2 + (1− γ) t2. It can be easily proved that µ0 > µ for any t > 0.
In addition, when γ becomes 0, we have µ0|γ=0 = v¯ and µ|γ=0 = v¯−2t < v¯.
Proof. Proof of Corollary 2, 3, and 4
We have derived in Proposition 1 that µ = v¯− t−√γm2 + (1− γ) t2 and
pND = v¯ −√γm2 + (1− γ) t2.
We can therefore prove that
d µ
d γ
=
d pND
d γ
= − m
2 − t2
2
√
γm2 + (1− γ) t2 < 0; (35)
d µ
d t
= −1− t(1− γ)√
γm2 + (1− γ) t2 < 0; (36)
36
d pND
d t
= − t(1− γ)√
γm2 + (1− γ) t2 < 0; (37)
d µ
dm
=
d pND
dm
= − mγ√
γm2 + (1− γ) t2 < 0. (38)
Therefore, µ and pND decreases with γ, t and m.
Proof. Proof of Corollary 6
We have derived in Corollary 5 that
∏
s =
(1−γ)µ
v¯
t. Recalling that µ =
v¯ − t−√γm2 + (1− γ) t2 as shown in Proposition 1, we can obtain
d
∏
s
d γ
=
∂
∏
s
∂γ
+
∂
∏
s
∂µ
dµ
dγ
= −tµ
v¯
+
t(1− γ)
v¯
(− m
2 − t2
2
√
γm2 + (1− γ) t2 ) < 0;
d
∏
s
dm
=
∂
∏
s
∂m
+
∂
∏
s
∂µ
dµ
dm
=
t(1− γ)
v¯
(− mγ√
γm2 + (1− γ) t2 ) < 0.
As a result,
∏
s decreases with γ and m.
Proof. Proof of Lemma 4
We have derived in Corollary 5 that
∏
s =
(1−γ)µ
v¯
t. Substituting µ =
v¯− t−√γm2 + (1− γ) t2 as derived in Proposition 1 into ∏s, we obtain that
Πs =
(1− γ)
v¯
t(v¯ − t−
√
γm2 + (1− γ) t2). (39)
As a result, we have the second-order condition as
d2Πs
dt2
= −(1− γ)
v¯
{2 + t(1− γ)[2t
2(1− γ) + 3γm2]√
(γm2 + (1− γ) t2)3 } (40)
We can prove that d
2Πt
dt2
< 0 for t ∈ [0,m).
Proof. Proof of Proposition 3
Substituting t = 0 and m respectively into the first-order condition (15)
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and Eq (12), we have
dΠs
d t
|t=0 = µ0(1− γ)
v¯
> 0; (41)
dΠs
d t
|t=m = (1− γ)
v¯
(v¯ − (4− γ)m) (42)
Because Πs is concave in t, we have the following results:
(i) when m < v¯
4−γ , Πs increases with t for all t ∈ [0,m);
(ii)when m > v¯
4−γ , there is a unique ts ∈ [0,m) satisfying the first-order
condition µ(ts) + ts
dµ
dts
= 0, maximizes Πs.
Proof. Proof of Corollary 7
We have derived the marginal effect of increasing m on the first-order
derivative of Πs with respect to t as
∂
∂m
(
∂Πs
∂t
) =
1− γ
v¯
(
∂µ
∂m
+ t
∂
∂m
(
∂µ
∂t
))
(43)
Recalling µ = v¯ − t −√γm2 + (1− γ) t2, we can obtain that ∂µ
∂t
= −1 −
t(1−γ)√
γm2+(1−γ)t2 and
∂µ
∂m
= − mγ√
γm2+(1−γ)t2 .
Therefore, we can prove that
∂
∂m
(
∂Πs
∂t
) = −1− γ
v¯
m3γ2√
(γm2 + (1− γ) t2s)3
< 0. (44)
As the first-order derivative of Πs with respect to t decreases with m , we
can prove that ts decreases with m.
Proof. Proof of Lemma 5
Part (ii) of the lemma is proved in the text. Here we prove part (i). We first
show that in equilibrium the high-type manager with hard information follows
a threshold disclosure strategy. To see this, suppose the manager withholds
information when firm value is v, and hence pays shareholders’ break-even
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price vNDBE . Because his payment would be v + t if he disclosed firm value,
we have vNDBE ≤ v + t. Because vNDBE is independent of v, it follows that the
manager strictly prefers to withhold information rather than discloseing it at
any higher firm value. Thus the manager withholds information if and only if
firm value is above a threshold µh.
Next, we assume t > t and show that (19) holds as an equality for all
p ∈ (mh, v¯ +ml). Consider two cases.
Case 1: µh + mh ≥ ml + v¯. Then, referring to the discussions in the text,
the probability that the manager is of high-type, withholds information, and
exits between p and p + dp is exactly (1− q) γ dp
v¯
: the fact that the manager
exits at p < ml + v¯ ≤ µh + mh implies that he must be of low-type or high-
type with soft information because, if instead he were of high-type with hard
information, then the corresponding firm value at which he exits would satisfy
v+mh = p and hence v < µh, which contradicts his disclosure strategy. Thus
(20) holds as an equality. Therefore the bidder would receive a strictly positive
profit if he wins at p ∈ (mh, v¯ +ml), establishing part (i).
Case 2: µh + mh < ml + v¯. When p ∈ (mh, µh +mh), the same logic as
above shows (20) holds as an equality. Hence the bidder would make a strictly
positive profit, thus he will bid at least to µh+mh. However, this would mean
that when v = µh, a high-type manager with hard information would receive
a non-positive profit if he withholds information, whereas he would receive a
positive profit of mh− t if he discloses firm value. This contradicts the premise
that µh is the point at which the manager is indifferent between withholding
and disclosing information. Thus Case 2 does not exist.
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